THE FUTURE ANGLO-GERMAN WAR WILL TRANSFORM INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO GROUPS OF POWERS

By Pyotr Nikolayevich Durnovo, February 1914

The central factor of our current period in world history is the rivalry between England and Germany. This rivalry must inevitably lead to an armed conflict between them, the outcome of which will likely be fatal for the defeated side. The interests of these two states are far too incompatible, and their simultaneous existence as great powers will, sooner or later, prove impossible. Indeed, on one side stands an island nation whose global significance rests on its dominion over the seas, world trade, and countless colonies. On the other side stands a powerful continental power whose limited territory is insufficient for its growing population. Therefore, Germany has directly and openly declared that its future lies on the seas, has developed enormous world trade with miraculous speed, built a formidable navy to protect it, and with its famous "Made in Germany" mark has created a mortal danger to its rival's industrial and economic well-being. Naturally, England cannot surrender without a fight, and between it and Germany, a life-and-death struggle is inevitable.

The impending armed conflict resulting from this rivalry cannot possibly be reduced to a duel between England and Germany. Their forces are too unequal and, at the same time, they are insufficiently vulnerable to each other. Germany can incite rebellion in India, South America, and especially dangerous uprising in Ireland, paralyze English maritime trade through privateering and perhaps submarine warfare, and thereby create food supply difficulties for Great Britain, but despite the boldness of German military leaders, they would hardly risk a landing in England unless a lucky chance helps them destroy or significantly weaken the English navy. As for England, Germany is completely invulnerable to it. All that is accessible to England is to seize German colonies, halt German maritime trade, and, in the most favorable case, destroy the German navy, but nothing more - and this alone cannot force the opponent to make peace. Therefore, England will undoubtedly try to resort to its previously successful tested means and decide on armed intervention only after securing the participation of strategically stronger powers on its side. And since Germany, in turn, will certainly not remain isolated, the future Anglo-German war will transform into an armed conflict between two groups of powers, one following German orientation, the other English.

IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISCERN ANY REAL BENEFITS RUSSIA HAS GAINED FROM ITS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH ENGLAND

Until the Russo-Japanese War, Russian policy adhered to neither orientation. Since the reign of Emperor Alexander III, Russia had been in a defensive alliance with France, one solid enough to ensure joint action by both states in case of attack on either one, but not so close as to obligate them to necessarily support with armed force all political actions and demands of the ally. Simultaneously, the Russian court maintained traditionally friendly relations, based on family ties, with Berlin. Thanks to this configuration, peace between the great powers remained undisturbed for many years, despite the abundance of combustible material in Europe. France was protected from German attack by its alliance with Russia, Germany was protected from French revanchist aspirations by Russia's proven peacefulness and friendship, Russia was protected from excessive Austrian-Hungarian machinations in the Balkan Peninsula by Germany's need to maintain good neighborly relations with it. Finally, isolated England, restrained by rivalry with Russia in Persia, traditional English diplomatic fears of our offensive movement toward India, and poor relations with France (particularly evident during the famous Fashoda incident), watched the strengthening of German naval power with alarm, yet hesitated to take active measures.

The Russo-Japanese War fundamentally changed the relationships between the great powers and brought England out of its isolated position. As is known, throughout the Russo-Japanese War, England and America maintained a favorable neutrality toward Japan, while we enjoyed equally benevolent neutrality from France and Germany. This would seem to have been the seed of the most natural political combination for us. But after the war, our diplomacy made a sharp turn and definitively set course for rapprochement with England. France was drawn into England's political orbit, forming the Triple Entente group with predominant English influence, and collision with the powers grouping around Germany became, sooner or later, inevitable.

What advantages did and do we expect from abandoning our traditional policy of distrust toward England and breaking our tested if not friendly then neighborly relations with Germany?

Looking somewhat carefully and examining the events that occurred after the Portsmouth Treaty, it is difficult to discern any real benefits we have gained from rapprochement with England. The only plus – improved relations with Japan – can hardly be considered a consequence of Russian-English rapprochement. In essence, Russia and Japan are created to live in peace, as they have absolutely nothing to divide. All of Russia's properly understood tasks in the Far East are fully compatible with Japan's interests. These tasks are essentially limited to very modest bounds. Too broad a flight of fantasy by overzealous executors, which had no foundation in actual state interests on one side, and excessive nervousness and sensitivity of Japan, which mistakenly took these fantasies for a consistently implemented plan on the other side, caused a collision that more skillful diplomacy could have avoided.

Russia needs neither Korea nor even Port Arthur. Access to the open sea is undoubtedly useful, but the sea itself is not a market, merely a route for more advantageous delivery of goods to consuming markets. Meanwhile, in our Far East we have not and will not for a long time have valuables promising any significant profits from their export. There are no markets there for our exports. We cannot count on broadly supplying our export goods to either developed America (industrially and agriculturally), nor poor and also industrial Japan, nor even coastal China and more distant markets, where our exports would inevitably meet with goods from industrially stronger competing powers.

What remains is inner China, with which our trade is conducted primarily by land. Thus, an open port would contribute more to the import of foreign goods to us than to the export of our domestic products. On the other hand, Japan, whatever may be said, does not covet our Far Eastern possessions. The Japanese are by nature a southern people, and the harsh conditions of our Far Eastern region cannot tempt them. It is known that even in Japan itself, the northern Yezo is sparsely populated; apparently, Japanese colonization is proceeding unsuccessfully even in the southern part of Sakhalin that was ceded to Japan by the Portsmouth Treaty. Having taken Korea and Formosa, Japan is unlikely to go further north, and its aspirations will likely be directed toward the Philippine Islands, Indochina, Java, Sumatra and Borneo. At most, what it might strive for is to acquire, purely for commercial reasons, some further sections of the Manchurian railway.

In short, peaceful coexistence – I will say more – close rapprochement between Russia and Japan in the Far East is entirely natural, regardless of any English mediation. The ground for agreement suggests itself. Japan is not a wealthy country; maintaining both a strong army and powerful fleet simultaneously is difficult for it. Its island position pushes it toward strengthening specifically its naval power. An alliance with Russia would allow it to focus all its attention on the fleet, so necessary given its already emerging rivalry with America, while leaving the protection of its interests on the mainland to Russia. On the other hand, we, having the Japanese fleet for naval defense of our Pacific coast, would be able to forever abandon our unrealistic dream of creating a navy in the Far East. Thus, in terms of relations with Japan, rapprochement with England has brought us no real benefit. It has given us nothing in terms of strengthening our position in Manchuria, Mongolia, or even in the Uriankhai region, where the uncertainty of our position testifies that agreement with England has, in any case, not freed our diplomacy's hands. On the contrary, our attempt to establish relations with Tibet met with sharp resistance from England.

Our position in Persia has not changed for the better since the agreement. Everyone remembers our predominant influence in that country under Shah Nasr-ed-Din, that is, precisely during the period of greatest tension in our relations with England. From the moment of rapprochement with the latter, we found ourselves involved in a series of incomprehensible attempts to impose on the Persian population a constitution completely unnecessary for it, and as a result, we ourselves contributed to the overthrow of a monarch loyal to Russia, to please inveterate opponents. In short, we not only gained nothing, but on the contrary, lost all along the line, destroying both our prestige and many millions of rubles, and even the precious blood of Russian soldiers, treacherously murdered and, to please England, not even avenged.

But the most negative consequences of rapprochement with England – and consequently fundamental divergence with Germany – have manifested in the Near East. As is known, Bismarck once made the famous statement that for Germany the Balkan question was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. Subsequently, Balkan complications began to attract incomparably more attention from German diplomacy, which took the "sick man" under its protection, but even then Germany long showed no inclination to risk relations with Russia over Balkan affairs. The proof is before us. Indeed, how easy it would have been for Austria, during the Russo-Japanese War and our subsequent turmoil, to realize its cherished aspirations in the Balkan Peninsula. But Russia at that time had not yet tied its fate to England, and Austria-Hungary was forced to miss the most advantageous moment for its goals.

However, it was enough for us to take the path of close rapprochement with England for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to immediately follow – which could have been accomplished so easily and painlessly in 1905 or 1906 – then the Albanian question arose and the combination with Prince Wied. Russian diplomacy tried to answer Austrian intrigues by forming the Balkan League, but this combination, as should have been expected, proved completely ephemeral. Intended against Austria, it immediately turned against Turkey and fell apart over the division of spoils captured from the latter. The result was only the final attachment of Turkey to Germany, in which it not without reason sees its only protector. Indeed, Russian-English rapprochement obviously means for Turkey England's abandonment of its traditional policy of closing the Dardanelles to us, while the formation under Russia's protection of the Balkan League appeared as a direct threat to Turkey's continued existence as a European state. Thus, Anglo-Russian rapprochement has brought us nothing really beneficial until now. In the future, it inevitably promises us armed conflict with Germany.

THE BASIC GROUPINGS IN THE COMING WAR

Under what conditions will this collision occur and what will be its likely consequences? The basic groupings in the future war are obvious: Russia, France and England on one side, Germany, Austria and Turkey on the other. It is more than likely that other powers will also take part in the war, depending on the various conditions under which war breaks out. But whether the immediate cause of war is a new collision of opposing interests in the Balkans, or a colonial incident like Algeciras, the basic grouping will remain the same. Italy, if it properly understands its interests, will not side with Germany.

Due to political and economic reasons, Italy undoubtedly strives to expand its current territory. This expansion can only be achieved at the expense of Austria on one side, and Turkey on the other. It is natural, therefore, that Italy will not side with those who guarantee the territorial integrity of the states at whose expense it wishes to realize its aspirations. Moreover, the possibility is not excluded that Italy might join the anti-German coalition if the fortunes of war inclined in its favor, in order to secure for itself the most advantageous conditions for participation in the subsequent division of spoils. In this respect, Italy's position aligns with the probable position of Romania, which will likely remain neutral until the scales of fortune tip to one side or the other. Then, guided by healthy political egoism, it will join the victors to be rewarded either at Russia's expense or at Austria's. Among other Balkan states, Serbia and Montenegro will undoubtedly side against Austria, while Bulgaria and Albania (if by then it has not formed at least an embryo of a state) will side against Serbia. Greece will probably remain neutral or side against Turkey, but only when the outcome is more or less predetermined.

The participation of other states will be incidental, and we should fear Sweden, which will naturally be among our opponents. Under such conditions, struggle with Germany presents enormous difficulties for us and will require incalculable sacrifices. The war will not catch the opponent off guard, and the degree of its preparedness will probably exceed our most exaggerated expectations. One should not think that this preparedness stems from Germany's own desire for war. War is unnecessary for it, as long as it could achieve its goal – ending sole dominion over the seas – without it. But since this vital goal for it meets opposition from the coalition, Germany will not retreat from war and will certainly even try to provoke it, choosing the most advantageous moment for itself.

THE MAIN BURDEN OF WAR WILL FALL ON RUSSIA

The main burden of war will undoubtedly fall on us, since England is hardly capable of taking broad participation in a continental war, while France, poor in human material, given the colossal losses that will accompany war under modern conditions of military technology, will probably adhere to strictly defensive tactics. The role of the battering ram, breaking through the very thickness of German defense, will fall to us, and yet how many factors will be against us and how much strength and attention we will have to spend on them.

From these unfavorable factors, we should exclude the Far East. America and Japan, the first by essence and the second by virtue of its current political orientation, are both hostile to Germany, and there is no basis to expect them to side with it. Moreover, the war, regardless of its outcome, will weaken Russia and divert its attention to the West, which naturally serves Japanese and American interests.

Therefore, our rear is sufficiently secured from the Far East, and at most they will extort from us some concessions of an economic nature for their benevolent neutrality. Moreover, the possibility is not excluded of America or Japan joining the anti-German side, but of course only as seizers of one or another poorly defended German colony. On the other hand, an outbreak of hostility against us in Persia is certain, probable unrest among Muslims in the Caucasus and Turkestan, the possibility of Afghanistan moving against us in connection with the latter is not excluded, finally, we should foresee very unpleasant complications in Poland and Finland. In the latter, an uprising will inevitably break out if Sweden proves to be among our opponents. As for Poland, we should expect that we will not be able to hold it in our hands during the war. And when it falls into the power of our opponents, they will undoubtedly attempt to provoke an uprising, which in essence is not very dangerous for us, but which we will still have to count among the unfavorable factors for us, especially since the influence of our allies may induce us to take such steps in the area of our relations with Poland that are more dangerous for us than any open uprising.

Are we prepared for such a stubborn struggle as the future war of European peoples will undoubtedly prove to be? To this question one must, without equivocation, answer in the negative. Less than anyone am I inclined to deny the many things that have been done for our defense since the Japanese war. Undoubtedly, however, these many things are insufficient given the unprecedented scale in which the future war will inevitably unfold. Our young legislative institutions are largely to blame for this insufficiency, having taken a dilettantish interest in our defense but far from grasping the full seriousness of the political situation developing under the influence of the orientation which, with society's sympathetic attitude, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs has followed in recent years.

Proof of this is the huge number of military and naval ministry bills remaining unconsidered, and in particular, the plan for organizing our state defense that was presented to the Duma under State Secretary Stolypin. Undisputedly, in the realm of troop training we have, according to specialists, achieved substantial improvement compared to the time preceding the Japanese war. According to the same specialists, our field artillery leaves nothing to be desired; the rifle is quite satisfactory; the equipment is comfortable and practical. But it is also undisputed that there are essential deficiencies in our defense organization.

In this regard, we must first note the inadequacy of our military supplies, which certainly cannot be blamed on the military department, since the planned procurement programs are far from fully implemented due to the low productivity of our factories. This insufficiency of ammunition supplies is all the more significant because, given the embryonic state of our industry, we will not have the ability during the war to make up for identified shortfalls by domestic means, while with both the Baltic and Black Seas closed to us, the import of defense items we lack from abroad will prove impossible.

Furthermore, an unfavorable circumstance for our defense is generally its excessive dependence on foreign industry, which, combined with the already noted cessation of any convenient foreign communications, will create a series of difficulties hard to overcome. The quantity of heavy artillery we have is far from sufficient, the importance of which was proven by the experience of the Japanese war, and we have few machine guns. We have barely begun organizing our fortress defense, and even the Revel fortress protecting access to the capital is not yet complete.

The network of strategic railways is insufficient, and the railways possess rolling stock that may be sufficient for normal traffic but is inadequate for the colossal demands that will be placed on us in case of European war. Finally, we should not lose sight of the fact that in the upcoming war, the most cultured, technically developed nations will be fighting. Every war has invariably been accompanied until now by new developments in military technology, and the technical backwardness of our industry does not create favorable conditions for us to adopt new inventions.

GERMANY'S AND RUSSIA'S VITAL INTERESTS NOWHERE COLLIDE

All these factors are hardly being given due consideration by our diplomacy, whose conduct toward Germany is not devoid, to a certain degree, of even some aggressiveness that could excessively hasten the moment of armed collision with Germany which, given the English orientation, is essentially inevitable. But is this orientation correct, and does even a favorable period of war promise us such advantages that would compensate for all the difficulties and sacrifices inevitable in an exceptionally intense war?

The vital interests of Russia and Germany nowhere collide and provide a complete basis for peaceful coexistence between these two states. Germany's future lies on the seas, that is, where Russia, essentially the most continental of all the great powers, has no interests. We have no overseas colonies and probably never will, and communication between different parts of the empire is easier by land than by sea. We do not feel an excess of population requiring territorial expansion, but even from the point of view of new conquests, what can victory over Germany give us? Poznań, East Prussia? But why do we need these areas, densely populated by Poles, when we already have difficulty managing Russian Poles. Why revive centrifugal aspirations, not yet extinct in the Vistula region, by bringing into the Russian state restless Poznań and East Prussian Poles, whose national demands even the firmer German authority, compared to Russian, cannot suppress?

Exactly the same applies to Galicia. It is clearly disadvantageous for us, in the name of national sentimentalism, to annex to our fatherland a region that has lost all living connection with it. After all, for the tiny handful of Russians in spirit among the Galicians, how many Poles, Jews, and Ukrainianized Uniates would we receive? The so-called Ukrainian or Mazepist movement is not dangerous to us now, but we should not let it grow by increasing the number of restless Ukrainian elements, as this movement contains the undoubted seed of extremely dangerous Little Russian separatism, which under favorable conditions could reach completely unexpected dimensions. The obvious goal pursued by our diplomacy in rapprochement with England – opening the straits – but, it seems, achieving this goal hardly requires war with Germany. After all, it was England, and not Germany at all, that closed our exit from the Black Sea. Was it not with Germany's assistance that we freed ourselves in 1871 from the humiliating restrictions imposed on us by England under the Paris Treaty?

And there is every reason to expect that the Germans would more readily than the English agree to grant us the straits, in whose fate they have little interest and at whose price they would gladly buy our alliance.

Moreover, we should not harbor exaggerated expectations from our occupation of the straits. Acquiring them is advantageous for us only insofar as they close the entrance to the Black Sea, which from that time becomes for us an internal sea, safe from enemy attacks.

But the straits do not give us an exit to the open sea, since beyond them lies a sea that consists almost entirely of territorial waters, a sea dotted with many islands, where, for example, it would cost the English fleet nothing to effectively close all entrances and exits for us, regardless of the straits. Therefore, Russia could boldly welcome such a combination which, without directly transferring the straits into our hands, would secure us against breakthrough into the Black Sea by an enemy fleet. Such a combination, achievable under favorable circumstances without any war, has the additional advantage that it would not violate the interests of the Balkan states, which would view our seizure of the straits with anxiety and quite understandable jealous feeling.

In the Transcaucasus, we could, as a result of war, expand territorially only at the expense of Armenian-populated areas, which, given the revolutionary nature of contemporary Armenian sentiments and dreams of a great Armenia, is hardly desirable, and in which, of course, Germany would hinder us even less than England, were we in alliance with it. Truly useful territorial and economic acquisitions for us are accessible only where our aspirations may meet obstacles from England, and not at all from Germany. Persia, the Pamirs, Kulja, Kashgaria, Dzungaria, Mongolia, the Urianhai region – these are all places where Russia's and Germany's interests do not collide, while Russia's and England's interests have collided repeatedly.

Germany is in exactly the same position regarding Russia, as it too could only tear away from us, in case of successful war, areas of little value to it, poorly suited for colonization due to their population: the Vistula region with its Polish-Lithuanian population, and the Baltic provinces with their Latvian-Estonian population, equally restless and hostile to Germans.

IN THE REALM OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS, RUSSIAN BENEFITS AND NEEDS DO NOT CONTRADICT GERMAN ONES

But one might object that territorial acquisitions, under modern conditions of national life, take second place and economic interests come to the fore. However, even in this realm Russian benefits and needs hardly contradict German ones as much as is commonly thought. It is beyond doubt, of course, that the current Russian-German trade treaties are disadvantageous for our agriculture and advantageous for German agriculture, but it is hardly correct to attribute this circumstance to Germany's cunning and unfriendliness.

We should not lose sight of the fact that these treaties are advantageous to us in many of their parts. The Russian delegates who concluded these treaties at the time were convinced supporters of developing Russian industry at whatever cost and, undoubtedly, consciously sacrificed, at least partially, the interests of Russian agriculture in favor of Russian industry's interests. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that Germany itself is far from being a direct consumer of most items of our agricultural foreign exports. For most products of our agricultural industry, Germany is only an intermediary, and consequently, it depends on us and the consuming markets to establish direct relations and thereby avoid expensive German intermediation. Finally, it is necessary to consider that the conditions of trade relations can change depending on the conditions of political coexistence between the contracting states, since no country benefits from the economic weakening of an ally, but on the contrary benefits from the ruin of a political opponent. In short, although it is undoubtedly true that the current Russian-German trade treaties are disadvantageous for us and that Germany, in concluding them, successfully exploited circumstances that developed favorably for it – that is, simply put, squeezed us – but this behavior cannot be counted as hostile and is a worthy-of-emulation act of healthy national egoism, which could not have been unexpected from Germany and which should have been taken into account. In any case, we see in Austria-Hungary an agricultural country in incomparably greater economic dependence on Germany than we are, which nevertheless does not prevent it from achieving such development in agriculture as we can only dream about.

Given all the above, concluding a trade treaty with Germany that is fully acceptable for Russia would seem to not at all require Germany's prior defeat. Good neighborly relations with it, thoughtful weighing of our real economic interests in various branches of the national economy, and long persistent bargaining with German delegates, who are undoubtedly called to protect the interests of their, not our, fatherland, are quite sufficient. I will say more: Germany's defeat in the area of our trade exchange would be disadvantageous for us.

Its defeat would undoubtedly end with peace dictated from the perspective of England's economic interests. The latter would exploit the success that fell to its share to the very extreme limits, and then in ruined Germany that has lost its sea routes we would only lose what is still a valuable consumer market for our products that find no other outlet.

Regarding Germany's economic future, Russia's and England's interests are directly opposite to each other.

It is advantageous for England to kill German maritime trade and German industry, turning it into a poor agricultural country if possible. It is advantageous for us that Germany develop its maritime trade and the industry it serves to supply the most distant world markets while opening its internal market to our agricultural products to supply its numerous working population.

But, independently of trade treaties, it is commonly pointed to the oppression of German dominance in Russian economic life, and the systematic implantation of German colonization, which supposedly presents an obvious danger to the Russian state. It seems, however, that such fears are largely exaggerated. The notorious Drang nach Osten was natural and understandable in its time, since Germany's territory could not accommodate its increased population, whose excess was pushed in the direction of least resistance, i.e., into the less densely populated neighboring country.

The German government was forced to reckon with the inevitability of this movement, but could hardly recognize it as serving its interests. After all, one way or another, German people were leaving the sphere of German statehood, thereby reducing their country's living strength. Of course, the German government, making every effort to maintain the settlers' connection with their former homeland, went even so far as to allow the original approach of dual citizenship. But it is undoubted, however, that a significant portion of German emigrants still settled finally and irrevocably in their new location and gradually broke ties with their former homeland. This circumstance, clearly not corresponding to Germany's state interests, evidently became one of the motivating stimuli for it to embark on the path of colonial policy and maritime trade, previously so foreign to it.

And now, as German colonies multiply and German industry and maritime trade closely connected with that develop, the German colonist wave is ebbing, and the day is not far off when the Drang nach Osten will pass into the realm of historical memories. In any case, German colonization, undoubtedly contradicting our state interests, must be stopped, and friendly relations with Germany are no obstacle to this. To advocate for the preferability of German orientation does not mean to stand for Russia's vassal dependence on Germany, and while maintaining friendly, neighborly ties with it, we must not sacrifice our state interests to this goal. And Germany will not object to fighting against the further influx of German colonists to Russia. It is more advantageous for Germany itself to direct the wave of migration to its colonies. Moreover, even when it did not have these colonies and German industry did not yet provide employment for the entire population, it still did not consider itself entitled to protest against the restrictive measures taken during Alexander III's reign regarding foreign colonization. As for German dominance in the realm of our economic life, this phenomenon hardly warrants the reproaches that are usually raised against it. Russia is too poor in both capital and industrial enterprise to manage without a broad influx of foreign capital. Therefore, a certain dependence on one foreign capital or another is inevitable for us until industrial enterprise and the material means of the population develop to such an extent that they make it possible to completely refuse the services of foreign entrepreneurs and their money. But while we need them, German capital is more advantageous for us than any other.

First of all, this capital is the cheapest of all, as it is content with the lowest percentage of entrepreneurial profit. This largely explains the comparative cheapness of German products and their gradual displacement of English goods from the world market. The lesser demands in terms of profitability of German capital results in it going into such enterprises which, due to their relatively low profitability, other foreign capital will not enter. Due to this same relative cheapness of German capital, its influx into Russia entails the outflow from Russia of smaller sums of entrepreneurial profits compared to English and French capital and thus more Russian rubles remain in Russia. Moreover, a significant share of profits obtained from German capital invested in Russian industry does not leave us at all but is spent in Russia.

Unlike English or French capitalists, German capitalists mostly move to Russia along with their capital. This property of theirs largely explains the striking abundance of German industrialists, factory owners and manufacturers compared to English and French ones that astonishes us.

Those others sit abroad, extracting from Russia to the last kopek the profits generated by their enterprises. On the contrary, German entrepreneurs live in Russia for long periods, and often settle there permanently. Whatever may be said, Germans, unlike other foreigners, quickly adapt to Russia and rapidly become Russified. Who has not seen French and English people living almost their entire lives in Russia, yet not speaking a word of Russian? On the contrary, how many Germans are seen who do not manage to express themselves in Russian, even if with an accent and broken speech? Moreover, who has not seen purely Russian people, Orthodox, devoted to Russian state principles to the depths of their souls, and yet only in the first or second generation descended from German immigrants? Finally, we should not forget that Germany itself is, to a certain degree, interested in our economic well-being. In this respect, Germany compares favorably to other states, which are interested exclusively in obtaining the highest possible return on capital invested in Russia, even at the cost of the country's economic ruin. On the contrary, Germany, in its capacity as a constant – though of course not disinterested – intermediary in our foreign trade, is interested in maintaining our homeland's productive forces as a source of profitable intermediary operations for it.

EVEN VICTORY OVER GERMANY PROMISES RUSSIA EXTREMELY UNFAVORABLE PROSPECTS

In any case, even if we acknowledge the necessity of eradicating German dominance in the realm of our economic life, even at the cost of completely expelling German capital from Russian industry, it would seem that corresponding measures could be implemented without war with Germany. This war will require such enormous expenditures that they will many times exceed the more than dubious benefits we would obtain from liberation from German dominance. Moreover, the consequence of this war will be such an economic situation compared to which the pressure of German capital will seem light.

For it is beyond doubt that the war will require expenditures exceeding Russia's limited financial resources. We will have to turn to credit from allied and neutral states, and it will not be granted for free. It is not even worth talking about what will happen if the war ends unsuccessfully for us. The financial-economic consequences of defeat cannot be calculated or even foreseen and will undoubtedly be reflected in the complete collapse of our entire national economy. But even victory promises us extremely unfavorable financial prospects: Germany, ruined to the end, will not be able to compensate us for the costs incurred. A peace treaty dictated in England's interests will not allow it to recover economically enough to cover our military expenses even later. The little that we might manage to wrest from it will have to be shared with allies, and our share will be crumbs, insignificant compared to military costs. Meanwhile, war loans will have to be paid not without pressure from the allies. After all, after the collapse of German power, we will no longer be needed by them. Moreover, our political might, increased due to victory, will induce them to weaken us at least economically. And so inevitably, even after victorious conclusion of the war, we will fall into such financial economic bondage to our creditors compared to which our current dependence on German capital will seem ideal. However sadly the economic prospects opening to us as a result of alliance with England, and consequently war with Germany, may develop – they still take second place to the political consequences of this essentially unnatural alliance.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY IS DEEPLY UNDESIRABLE FOR BOTH SIDES, AS IT AMOUNTS TO WEAKENING THE MONARCHIST PRINCIPLE

We should not lose sight of the fact that Russia and Germany represent the conservative principle in the civilized world, opposed to the democratic principle embodied by England and, to a far lesser degree, France. However strange it may seem, England, monarchist and conservative to the bone at home, has always in its external relations acted as the patron of the most demagogic aspirations, invariably indulging all popular movements aimed at weakening the monarchist principle.

From this perspective, the struggle between Germany and Russia, regardless of its outcome, is deeply undesirable for both sides, as it undoubtedly amounts to weakening the global conservative principle, whose only reliable bulwark these two great powers represent. Moreover, one cannot help but foresee that, under the exceptional conditions of the approaching general European war, such a war, again regardless of its outcome, will present a mortal danger for both Russia and Germany. According to deep conviction, based on careful many-year study of all contemporary anti-state currents, social revolution will inevitably break out in the defeated country, which by force of circumstances will spread to the victor country.

The channels by which both countries have been invisibly connected over many years of peaceful coexistence are too numerous for fundamental social upheavals playing out in one of them not to be reflected in the other. That these upheavals will be specifically social rather than political in character - of this there can be no doubt, and this applies not only to Russia but also to Germany. Russia presents an especially favorable ground for social upheavals, where the masses undoubtedly profess the principles of unconscious socialism. Despite the opposition nature of Russian society, as unconscious as the socialism of the broad strata of the population, political revolution in Russia is impossible, and any revolutionary movement will inevitably degenerate into socialist revolution. Our opposition has no one behind it, it has no support among the people, who see no difference between a government official and an intellectual. The Russian commoner, peasant and worker alike does not seek political rights, which are both unnecessary and incomprehensible to him.

The peasant dreams of being freely granted someone else's land, the worker - of receiving all the capitalist's capital and profits, and their aspirations do not go beyond this. And one need only widely cast these slogans among the population, one need only have the government authority freely permit agitation in this direction - Russia will undoubtedly be plunged into anarchy, as experienced in the memorable period of turmoil of 1905-1906. War with Germany will create exceptionally favorable conditions for such agitation. As already noted, this war is fraught with enormous difficulties for us and cannot prove to be a triumphal march to Berlin. Military setbacks are inevitable - let us hope, partial ones - and various shortcomings in our supplies will prove inevitable. Given our society's exceptional nervousness, exaggerated significance will be attributed to these circumstances, and given this society's opposition nature, everything will be blamed on the government.

It will be good if the latter does not surrender and firmly declares that during wartime no criticism of state authority is permissible and decisively suppresses any opposition performances. Given the opposition's lack of serious roots in the population, that will be the end of it. The people did not follow the authors of the Vyborg Manifesto in their time, and they will not follow them now either.

But worse may happen: governmental authority will make concessions, try to come to an agreement with the opposition and thereby weaken itself by the moment socialist elements emerge. Although it sounds paradoxical, agreement with the opposition in Russia absolutely weakens the government. The fact is that our opposition does not want to reckon with the fact that it represents no real force. The Russian opposition is thoroughly intellectual, and therein lies its weakness, as between the intelligentsia and the people we have a deep chasm of mutual misunderstanding and distrust. An artificial electoral law is necessary, moreover, direct influence of governmental authority is still needed to ensure election to the State Duma of even the most ardent defenders of people's rights. If the government were to deny them support, leave elections to their natural course - the legislative institutions would not see within their very walls a single intellectual, besides a few agitator-demagogues. However the members of our legislative institutions might proclaim about the people's trust in them, the peasant would sooner believe a landless government official than a landowner-Octobrist sitting in the Duma; the worker would treat with greater trust a salaried factory inspector than a manufacturer-legislator, even if the latter professed all the principles of the Kadet party.

It is more than strange under such conditions to demand that governmental authority seriously reckon with the opposition, for its sake abandon the role of impartial regulator of social relations, and appear before the broad popular masses as an obedient organ of the class aspirations of the intellectual-propertied minority of the population. By demanding from governmental authority responsibility before class representation and obedience to an artificially created parliament (recall V. Nabokov's famous saying: "Let executive power submit to legislative power!"), our opposition essentially demands from the government the psychology of a savage who crafts an idol with his own hands and then worships it with trepidation.

RUSSIA WILL BE PLUNGED INTO HOPELESS ANARCHY, WHOSE OUTCOME IS DIFFICULT TO FORESEE

If the war ends victoriously, suppressing the socialist movement will ultimately not present insurmountable difficulties. There will be agrarian disturbances based on agitation for the necessity of rewarding soldiers with additional land allotments, there will be labor unrest in transitioning from the probably elevated wartime wages to normal rates - and, one must hope, it will be limited to this, until the wave of German social revolution reaches us. But in case of failure, the possibility of which, in struggling with such an opponent as Germany, cannot be unforeseen - social revolution in its most extreme manifestations is inevitable for us.

As already indicated, it will begin with all failures being attributed to the government. A furious campaign against it will begin in legislative institutions, resulting in revolutionary outbursts in the country. These latter will immediately advance socialist slogans, the only ones that can raise and group together broad strata of the population - first black redistribution, and then general division of all valuables and properties. The defeated army, having lost, moreover, during the war its most reliable cadre composition, captured largely spontaneously by the general peasant aspiration for land, will prove too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. The legislative institutions and opposition-intellectual parties lacking real authority in the people's eyes will not be able to restrain the unleashed popular waves raised by them, and Russia will be plunged into hopeless anarchy, whose outcome cannot even be foreseen.

However strange it may seem at first glance, given the exceptional balance of German nature, Germany too, in case of defeat, will experience no less social upheaval. The unsuccessful war will reflect too heavily on the population for its consequences not to bring to the surface deeply hidden destructive aspirations. The peculiar social structure of contemporary Germany is built on the factually predominant influence of agrarians, Prussian Junkers and peasant-proprietors.

These elements are the bulwark of Germany's deeply conservative system, under Prussia's dominant leadership. The vital interests of these classes require protectionist policy regarding agriculture, import duties on grain and, consequently, high prices for all agricultural products. But Germany, with its limited territory and increased population, has long since transformed from an agricultural country into an industrial one, and therefore protection of agriculture essentially amounts to taxing the larger half of the population in favor of the smaller half. The compensation for this majority is the broad development of German industrial exports to the most distant markets, so that the advantages derived by this route give industrialists and the working population the ability to pay elevated prices for agricultural products consumed at home.

With Germany's defeat, it will lose world markets and maritime trade, for the war's purpose - on the part of its real instigator England - is the destruction of German competition. With this achieved, the working masses, deprived not only of elevated but of any earnings, having suffered during the war, and naturally embittered, will present receptive ground for anti-agrarian, and then anti-social propaganda by socialist parties.

In turn, these latter, taking into account wounded patriotic feeling and popular irritation accumulated due to the lost war against militarism and the feudal-bourgeois system that deceived the population's hopes, will turn from the path of peaceful revolution on which they have so steadfastly held until now, and take a purely revolutionary path. The numerous class of landless agricultural laborers in Germany will play its role, especially in case of socialist uprisings on agrarian grounds in neighboring Russia. Independent of this, currently hidden separatist aspirations in southern Germany will come to life, Bavaria's concealed hostility to Prussian dominance will manifest in all its fullness - in short, such a situation will be created which will little yield in its intensity to the situation in Russia.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE OF CULTURED NATIONS IS MOST THREATENED BY ENGLAND'S STRIVING TO MAINTAIN ITS SLIPPING DOMINION OVER THE SEAS

The totality of all the above cannot but lead to the conclusion that rapprochement with England promises us no benefits, and the English orientation of our diplomacy is fundamentally mistaken in its essence. We have no common path with England, it should be left to its fate, and we need not quarrel with Germany over it.

The Triple Entente is an artificial combination, having no foundation in interests, and the future belongs not to it, but to the incomparably more vital close rapprochement between Russia, Germany, France reconciled with the latter, and Japan bound to Russia by a strictly defensive alliance. Such a political combination, devoid of any aggressiveness toward other states, will for many years ensure peaceful coexistence of cultured nations, which is threatened not by Germany's warlike designs, as English diplomacy strives to prove, but only by England's completely natural striving to maintain at all costs its slipping dominion over the seas. In this direction, and not in fruitless seeking of ground for agreement with England that contradicts our state views and goals by its very essence, all efforts of our diplomacy should be concentrated.

With this, it goes without saying that Germany too must meet our aspirations to restore tested friendly-allied relations with it and work out, by closest agreement with us, such conditions for our coexistence that would not give ground for anti-German agitation from our constitutional-liberal parties, which by their very nature are forced to adhere not to conservative-German, but to liberal-English orientation.